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IMPASSE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS
AND TEACHER STRIKES
Public school teachers have no right to strike under Michigan law,1 but
the power to strike exists. Michigan residents witnessed forty teacher
strikes in the autumn of 1973 alone.2 Among them was the forty-four-day
strike by Detroit teachers.3 The strikes during the past fall were not an
unfortunate aberration. Ninety percent of the strikes in Michigan are by
school teachers.4 In the public education context, the threat of a strike
no longer brings negotiating parties together. A new mechanism for res-
olution of deadlocks in teacher-school board contract disputes is needed.
This article describes the problem, outlines impasse resolution procedures
presently used, and proposes a mechanism better suited to the needs of
the public.
1. CURRENT LAWS AFFECTING TEACHERS' STRIKES
Work stoppages by teachers can be traced to failures to resolve conflict-
ing interests by less drastic means. The three major actors are the school
board, the teachers, and the public. The children's interests are not inde-
pendently voiced. Instead, each of the three actors sincerely declares it-
self to be the guardian of the children's interests. Ostensibly, quality
education is everyone's only concern, and all other demands relate to its
achievement. Yet, beyond this basic unanimity the protagonists' interests
diverge.
With respect to economic issues, teachers demand increased salary
schedules and additional fringe benefits in order to meet the rising cost of
living and attract the best available people to the teaching profession. The
school board may sympathize, but, in determining salary levels, it must
consider other areas of the budget, such as maintenance, supplies, activ-
ities, and support personnel. Until new methods of financing public educa-
1 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.202 (1967). The statute states:
No person holding a position by appointment or employment in the
government of the state of Michigan, or in the goverment of any 1 or
more of the political subdivisions thereof, or in the public school service,
or in any public or special district, or in the service of any authority,
commission, or board, or in any other branch of the public service,
hereinafter called a "public employee," shall strike.
2 Address by Robert Howlett, Chairman, Michigan Employment Relations Com-
mission, at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Nov. 6, 1973 [herein-
after cited as Howlett Address].
3 BNA GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. No. 526, at B-18 (Oct. 22, 1973). At least 10,500
teachers participated in the Detroit strike. BNA GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. No. 524, at
B-17 (Oct. 8, 1973).
4 Howlett Address, supra note 2.
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tion are devised, the board is also constrained5 by millage elections,"
which provide the voters' only opportunity to control available revenues.
Policy and programs are another source of conflict. While public pres-
sure groups may influence some program areas,7 the battle over policy
is generally fought between the board and -the teachers. 8 The teachers, as
professionals who actually spend time in the classroom, consider them-
selves better qualified to formulate educational policy than the predom-
inantly lay school board. On the other hand, the board often considers
teacher participation to be an invasion of its previously unquestioned
managerial prerogatives. Furthermore, some policy questions are inte-
grally related to financial considerations."
The public's interest in the prevention of teacher strikes must also be
acknowledged. This interest includes having children in school on week-
days during the traditional school year so that the children can obtain an
education and be under supervision. Parents arrange their lives and work
schedules in reliance on the schools being in session. Teacher strikes de-
feat this interest in stability.
These conflicting interests come to the forefront when teachers' contracts
are being negotiated and can lead to bargaining stalemates and strikes.
During negotiations, the competition between the teachers and the board
for the public's good will and support intensifies as does each side's need
to believe that its position and convictions are correct. Some manner of
resolving the deadlock that results from the conflict of the interests must
be instituted.
Teacher strikes are but one facet of the expanding area of public sector
unionism. While forty-one states' 0 either require or authorize collective
5 Rehmus, Constraints on Local Goi'ernments in Public Employee Bargaining, 67
MICH. L. REV. 919 (1969).
6 See MICH. CONST. art. 9, § 6. Michigan, like most states, limits the amount of
millage that can be levied upon property without specific authorization from the
voters.
7 For example, sex education programs seem to arouse public debate.
8 Wollett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MICH. L.
REV. 1017 (1969).
9 For example, teachers often request smaller classes as a means of improving the
children's education, yet smaller classes mean more teachers and more salaries.
10 According to the compilation of state public employee statutes in BNA Govern-
ment Employees Relations Reporter, the following states either require or authorize
collective bargaining or meet and confer procedures with respect to at least some
groups of public employees: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, e.g.,
CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 3500 et seq. (West 1966); N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 200 (McKinney
1973). Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia
do not specifically deal with public employee bargaining. North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Texas take a middle position. For example, North Carolina bars mem-
bership in any national labor organization and forbids the negotiation of any col-
lective agreements. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-97 (1965). The law forbidding public em-
ployers to bargain with labor unions on wages, hours, or conditions of employment
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bargaining or meet and confer procedures in the public sector, only
Alaska," Hawaii, -1 2  Montana,'- Oregon, 14 Pennsylvania,'; and Ver-
mont16 allow a limited right to strike. The Michigan Public Employment
was said to extend to professional organizations acting as unions. 40 Op. N.C. AT'Y
GEN. 274 (1969). This interpretation would bar a school board or school district
from negotiating with a teacher's association. A court found the provision prohibiting
union membership unconstitutional, although it agreed that the state could forbid
governmental bodies to make contracts or agreements with unions. Atkins v. City of
Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). While South Carolina has no statutes
authorizing public employees to organize and bargain collectively, it provides an
employee grievance procedure for state employees, S.C. CODE ANN. § 1.49-11 to
1.49-14 (Supp. 1971), and for county and municipal employees, S.C. CODE ANN. §
1.66-11 to 1.66-16 (Supp. 1971). The public employee bargaining statute in Texas
covers police and firefighters, but applies only in local jurisdictions in which voters
petition their municipal governments for a referendum and adopt the law by a ma-
jority vote. The act grants exclusive recognition and bargaining rights, prohibits
strikes, and permits binding arbitration in the event of bargaining impasses. TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. art. 5154c-1 (Supp. 1974).
11Alaska's Employment Relations Act, ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972), divides
public employees into three categories with respect to granting the right to strike.
Essential employees are prohibited from striking; semi-essential employees are
granted a limited right to strike; and nonessential employees are allowed to strike.
12 Although Hawaii grants public employees a limited right to strike provided that
they first exhaust mediation and factfinding procedures, strikes endangering the public
health and safety are unlawful, and the Public Employment Relations Board may
make adjustments to avoid or remove any imminent or present dangerous aspects of
such strikes. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 89-11, 89-12 (Supp. 1973).
1" The Montana statute, MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 41-2209 (Supp. 1973), applies
only to nurses, prohibits strikes only if another strike is in progress at any other
health care facility within a 150-mile radius, and requires that the health care facility
be given thirty-days notice of the date of the strike.
14 The new Oregon public employees law authorizes strikes by public employees
only under the following conditions: the employees must be in an appropriate and
certified bargaining unit; they must have complied, in good faith, with the specified
mediation and factfinding procedures; they must have given ten-days notice of their
intent to strike; proceedings to prevent any prohibited practice must have been ex-
hausted; and thirty days must have elapsed since the publication of the factfinder's
recommendations. A public employer may petition a county circuit court for in-
junctive relief in the event that the permissible strike "creates a clear and present
danger or threat" to the public health, safety, and welfare. The relief then granted
must include an order to submit the dispute to final and binding arbitration. The
statute also provides for binding arbitration of labor disputes involving public em-
ployees not permitted to strike: policemen, firemen, and correctional or mental health
institution guards. Ch. 536, § 16, [1973] Ore. Acts, amending ORE. REV. STAT. §
243.735 (1971).
15 Pennsylvania allows public employees, other than guards at prisons or mental
hospitals, or employees directly involved with and necessary to the functioning of the
courts, a limited right to strike, provided that the strike occurs after exhaustion of
mediation and factfinding procedures and unless or until the courts determine that
the strike creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health, safety, or welfare
of the public. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 §§ 1101.1001-1101.1003 (Supp. 1973).
16 Under the new Vermont act strikes by municipal employees, policemen, and
firefighters are not prohibited unless called within thirty days after a factfinding
report has been issued; after both parties have voluntarily submitted a dispute to
final and binding arbitration; after a decision or award has been issued by the arbi-
trator; or if the strike will endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the public. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (Supp. 1973). Strikes by teachers are prohibited, but an
injunction can be issued by a court only after a finding that the strike action "poses a
clear and present danger to a sound program of school education which in the light of
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Relations Act 17 extends bargaining rights to all public employees except
those in ;the state classified service.18 In addition, the Michigan statute
proscribes strikes by public employees including teachers' and provides
for elections, 20 mediation of grievances, 2' and review of disciplinary
actions following prohibited strikes. 22
In spite of this legislation, teacher-school board negotiations have been
fraught with problems rising from three sources: 23 the courts' ambiv-
alence in dealing with the strike proscription,2 4 the lack of effective sanc-
tions for Onlawful strikes ,'5 and the paradoxical situation created by the
legislation itself, which allows teachers to organize and bargain collec-
tively, yet denies them a right to strike 26 without providing an alternative
procedure to meet their legitimate demands.2 7 Other idiosyncrasies of
all relevant circumstances it is in the best public interest to prevent." VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 16, § 2010 (Supp. 1973).
17 Michigan Public Employment Relations Act (PERA), MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN.
§§ 423.201-423.216 (1967).
18 MICH. CONST. of 1963, Art. 11, § 5; MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.204(a)
(1967); Welfare Emp. Union v. Michigan Civil Service Comm'n, 28 Mich. App. 343,
184 N.W.2d 247 (1970).
19 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.202 (1967).
20 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.212 (1967).
21 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.207 (1967).
22 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.206 (1967).
23 Address by Professor Harry T. Edwards, Teachers Strikes, Striking Back, Phi
Alpha Delta Luncheon, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Oct. 18, 1973.
24 Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 885, 892 (1973); Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the
Prevention of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260, 265-68 (1969).
25 The ineffectiveness of sanctions in teacher strikes was demonstrated in the De-
troit strike. Settlement between the Detroit teachers and the school board was finally
reached when the school board agreed not to press its suit against the union for
strike-related damages, including salaries of administrators, custodians, and others
which the board paid while the schools were closed. The damages were estimated
at more than one million dollars. In return for the school board's dropping its dam-
age suit, the union agreed to abandon its $22 million unfair labor practice action
against the board. The fines, imposed by Wayne County Circuit Judge Thomas Foley,
of $11,000. per day assessed against the Detroit Federation of Teachers and a total
of $1,000. per day against the union's three chief officers, are being appealed. BNA
GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. No. 526, at B-18 (Oct. 22, 1973); Detroit Free Press, Oct. 18,
1973, at 1, col. 5.
26 The argument that the withholding of services by teachers in the fall of the year
is not a strike was dispensed with by the Michigan Supreme Court in Holland School
Dsit. v. Education Ass'n, 7 Mich. App. 569, 152 N.W.2d 572, rev'd, 380 Mich. 314,
157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). The argument was that since the teachers had not signed
new contracts after the expiration of their old agreement, they were not public em-
ployees subject to PERA and could not be considered on strike. The majority found
sufficient holdover contact with the employment to justify a finding that the teachers
were in fact public employees subject to PERA. The court also ruled that the refusal
to sign contracts constituted a strike within the statutory definition. MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 423.201 (1967). Despite these findings and a conclusion that an in-
junction was a permissible remedy, the court reversed, denied injunctive relief, and
remanded the case for proceedings on the merits.
27 For a discussion of how to prevent strikes by public employees without denying
them the right to organize and bargain collectively see Kheel, Strikes and Public
Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1969). But see Anderson, Strikes and Impasse
Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REV. 943, 947 (1969).
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teacher strikes concern the aftermath of the strike. Striking teachers, un-
like other employees, lose no work days as a result of the strike. 28
Schools almost always remain in session the full 180 days, and teachers
are subject to only the inconvenience resulting from the extension of the
school year,29 an inconvenience shared by students and their families.
Thus, current legislation prohibiting teacher strikes, while promoting
collective bargaining, does not confront the unconventional labor relations
context of teacher-school board negotiations. This past fall, Detroit teach-
ers struck -in spite of -the statutory prohibition, ignored a court order to
return to work,30 and, when the Board refused to capitulate, they took
their disagreement to binding arbitration.-' In short, Michigan's legisla-
tive proscription of teachers' strikes has been largely disregarded. The
consequent lack of balance and coherence in the law32 could be allevi-
ated by a more effective impasse resolution device which would provide
a viable alternative to the frequent, although statutorily prohibited, strikes.
II. IMPASSE RESOLUTION DEVICES
Many commentators feel that the disputing parties best understand
their problems, and, since the parties must live with the final agreement,
they should negotiate without interference. 3 Yet, work stoppages are
28 In unions with strike funds sufficient for the duration of the strike, striking
workers similarly do not lose any money.
29 Detroit schools will remain in session until July 12 this year as a result of the
fall strike. Telephone interview with Grace Butts, Detroit Board of Education, in
Detroit, Michigan, Oct. 22, 1973.
30 The 10,500 teachers were ordered, on September 26, 1973, to return to work
the next day by a circuit court, and on October 4 the same court found the union
guilty of contempt (Wayne County Circuit Court, Sept. 26, 1973) in Detroit Free
Press, Sept. 27, 1973, at 1, col. 2; BNA GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. No. 524, at B-17
(Oct. 8, 1973).
31 The most hotly disputed issues-salaries, class size, and teacher accountability-
were submitted to arbitration proceedings. A three-member panel will make binding
decisions on salaries and class size, while teacher accountability will be considered
by a governor's arbitration panel that will render a nonbinding opinion in the spring
of 1974. Detroit Free Press, Oct. 17, 1973, at 3, col. 6; BNA Gov'T EMP. REL. REP.
No. 526, at B-18 (Oct. 22, 1973).
32 Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DU-
QUESNE L. REv. 357 (1972). The article notes:
The net result [has been] to allow the judiciary to make the law in a
vital area affecting not only numerous employees but the public at
large. It should be noted that the court makes this law, not as a care-
fully debated and reasoned outgrowth of a full appreciation of the
problems involved, but rather on the basis of the equities of a particular
case.
Id. at 375. Edwards' comment concerns the effect of inadequate comprehensive plan-
ning by states with regard to the right of public sector employees to strike. Although
Michigan has legislation in force proscribing public employee strikes, the problems
mentioned still arise because the proscription has been ineffective. Id.
33 Gould, Public Employment: Mediation, Fact Finding and Arbitration, 55
A.B.A.J. 835, 836 (1969). Kheel notes that "there is no workable substitute for col-
lective bargaining-even in government-and that our best chance to prevent strikes
against the public interest lies in improving the practice of bargaining." Kheel, supra
note 27, at 941.
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becoming a more frequent part of the process of reaching agreement in
the public sector.3 4 Therefore, it becomes imperative to explore the use
of outside assistance to aid in impasse resolution.
Any impasse resolution method utilized in the field of public education
must have two particular characteristics. First, the machinery must be de-
signed to avoid giving either party the impression that it can gain more
through the impasse mechanism than it can at the bargaining table. Sec-
ondly, the method must offer the teachers an adequate substitute for the
strike.3 5
The basic impasse resolution devices are mediation,30 factfinding,37
and various forms of arbitration. Arbitration can be voluntary or compul-
sory, of interests or of grievances. Although grievance arbitration 38 has
34 Kheel, supra note 27, at 932; McAvoy, Binding Arbitration of Contract Terms:
A New Approach to the Resolution of Disputes in the Public Sector, 72 CoLUM. L.
REV. 1192 (1972). See generally U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR,
REP. No. 348, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT 1958-1968 (1970); U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STATISTIcs, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1727, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES
1970 (1972), as quoted in Shaw & Clark, Public Sector Strikes: An Empirical Analysis,
2 J.L. & EDUC. 217 (1973). "In the past ten years, the number of public sector strikes
has increased dramatically. In 1960 there were only 36 strikes accounting for
58,400 lost man-days of work; in 1970 there were 412 strikes resulting in 2,023,300
lost man-days of work." Id. at 217.
There are essentially four different kinds of strikes: recognitional strikes, jurisdic-
tional strikes, strikes during the term of an agreement, and economic strikes. A sig-
nificant portion of the public sector strikes to date have been recognitional. Of the
412 strikes by public employees during 1970, fifty-nine were over union organization
and security. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1727, at 37. The purpose of a strike for
recognition is to force the public employer to recognize and bargain collectively with
the union. A jurisdictional strike involves an attempt.by the striking union to gain or
protect its jurisdiction over work assigned to or claimed by another group of em-
ployees. Although the incidence of such strikes in the public sector has been rela-
tively low, several have occurred and they are likely to continue. Shaw & Clark, supra
at 219. Strikes during the term of the agreement can be prevented, as in the private
sector, by including a no-strike clause in the contract and providing for the arbitra-
tion of grievances that arise during the term of the agreement. Id. at 221. The most
common type of strike in the public sector is the economic strike. In an economic
strike the union attempts to pressure the public employer to resolve the issues dis-
puted in negotiations. Id. at 223.
35 Johnson, Collective Bargaining and the California Public Teacher, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 340, 377 (1969).
30 The mediator utilizes his neutral position to offer compromises and resolve dis-
putes regarding the underlying facts in issue. Thus, mediation can help parties focus
on the issues and find solutions.
37 Factfinding is sometimes used in conjunction with mediation, but can be used
independently. Each side presents its positions and arguments to an expert outsider
who makes recommendations for settlement of the disputed issues. Even if one or
both parties are not receptive to the recommendations, the value of factfinding is
that when the recommendations are made public, they offer some advantage to the
party whose views the factfinder more nearly supports. In addition, a factfinder's
recommendations carry moral force which can cause considerable public pressure on
the recalcitrant party to accept the recommendations rather than to resort to a
strike or lockout.
38 Ninety-four percent of collective bargaining agreements negotiated between labor
and management in the United States contain grievance arbitration clauses, and all
but 1 percent permit one of the two sides to obtain arbitration during the term of the
contract without obtaining an agreement from the other side to arbitrate the dispute
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been used successfully for some time, interest arbitration, the determin-
ation of certain terms of a new collective bargaining contract by an im-
partial third person, is a fairly recent development and is not as widely
accepted.39
A. Nonbinding Devices
The utility of both mediation and factfinding is considerably circum-
scribed because they are nonbinding. These mechanisms do not provide
the element of coercion often necessary to force a compromise and, there-
fore, can not be effective if the parties refuse to yield.40 Furthermore,
factfinding may result in a hardening of the positions on each side, 41 thus
deterring collective bargaining. 42 For example, when it is known that
factfinding will follow mediation, parties often hold back offers for initial
presentation to the factfinder.4 3 In addition, when mediation and fact-
finding have been used in teacher-school board negotiations, teachers have
often been willing to accept the recommendations, while the more power-
ful school board has rejected or simply ignored them.4 4 School board
disregard of the nonbinding recommendations lends support to the teach-
ers' belief that they are in an inferior position in the collective bargaining
process. 45 Consequently, neither mediation nor factfinding provides an
adequate substitute for -the strike. 46 As long as resort to a strike is the
teachers' most effective way of resolving impasses, the public's interest
in uninterrupted education will not be met.
B. Binding Interest Arbitration
Because nonbinding impasse resolution mechanisms have often proved
ineffective, 47 interest arbitration may be the only viable alternative to a
strike when agreement can not be reached. Arbitration is the only method
that binds both -parties to the result. Like a strike, interest arbitration im-
poses a cost of disagreement and, of necessity, involves concessions by
both parties. By enhancing the weaker party's bargaining power in this
in question. Gould, Substitutes for the Strike Weapon, 28 ARB. J. 111, 112-13 (1973).
The Supreme Court strongly endorsed voluntary grievance arbitration (arbitration
pursuant to a prior agreement to arbitrate defined disputes during a contract term)
in the Steelworkers Trilogy. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
39 Fleming, "Interest" Arbitration Revisited, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1973).
40 The history of teacher-school board disputes demonstrates that both the teachers
and the board are often unyielding. Dupont & Tobin, Teacher Negotiations into the
Seventies, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711 (1971).
41 Gould, supra note 33, at 838.
42 Stevens, The Management of Labor Disputes in the Public Sector, 51 ORE. L.
REV. 191, 200 (1970).
43 Dupont & Tobin, supra note 40, at 729; Stevens, supra note 42, at 200.
44 Dupont & Tobin, supra note 40, at 726, 730; Johnson, supra note 35, at 377.
45 Note, Striking a Balance in Bargaining with Public School Teachers, 56 IOWA L.
REV. 598, 611 (1971).
46 Dupont & Tobin, supra note 40, at 727; Stevens, supra note 42, at 200.
47 E.g., Johnson, supra note 35, at 377; McAvoy, supra note 34, at 1192.
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way, arbitration redresses the perceived imbalance of bargaining power
and lessens the felt need to strike.48
A frequent and serious objection to compulsory arbitration, whether
in the private4 9 or public sector, is that it undermines good faith collective
bargaining.50 The thrust of the argument is that parties required to sub-
mit their dispute to compulsory interest arbitration will not make a seri-
ous attempt to reach agreement during negotiations or through mediation
and factfinding. Therefore, neither side will concede in the preliminary
stages of negotiation for fear of prejudicing its case in 'the arbitration
proceedings. Anticipating that the arbitrator will split the difference, nei-
ther side will want to disclose how far it is really willing to compromise
on each issue. Consequently, these critics contend that collective bargain-
ing ending in compulsory arbitration will provoke extreme positions by
the parties.
One response of interest arbitration apologists is that, once all other
procedures are exhausted, efficient resolution of collective bargaining
disputes without strikes justifies some erosion of free collective bargain-
ing. Interest arbitration does not necessarily mean the demise of collec-
tive bargaining if arbitration is used sparingly and if the parties are un-
certain about the outcome of arbitration.5 1 Moreover, experiments with
compulsory interest arbitration have demonstrated that the -availability of
arbitration does not harm the collective bargaining process.5 2
A great deal of the sentiment against legislated mandatory arbitration
stems from its compulsory nature, which conflicts with the concept of
voluntarism in employer-employee relations. 5 ' Some believe that compul-
sory arbitration would destroy self-determination, which is a hallmark of
48 Johnson, supra note 35. See also McAvoy, supra note 34; Stevens, Is Compulsory
Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining, 5 IND. REL. 38, 50 (1966); Note, supra note
45, at 611-12.
49 Many argue against compulsory arbitration in the private sector. See, e.g.,
Farmer, Compulsory Arbitration-A Management Lawyer's View, 51 VA. L. REV.
396 (1965); Feller, Compulsory Arbitration-A Union Lawyer's View, 51 VA. L.
REV. 410 (1965). But see Rubenstein, The Bugaboo of Compulsory Arbitration, 23
LAB. L.J. 167 (1972). Seinsheimer, What's So Terrible About Compulsory Arbi-
tration? 26 ARB. J. 219 (1971).
50 Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REV.
459, 468 (1971); Garber, Compulsory Arbitration in the Public Sector: A Proposed
Alternative, 26 ARB. J. 226, 230-31 (1971); Gould, supra note 33, at 839; Johnson,
supra note 35, at 378, quoting M. LIEBERMAN & M. MOSKOW, COLLECTIVE NEGOTIA-
TIONS FOR TEACHERS 319 (1966), quoting A.T.A. MAGAZINE, Oct., 1964, at 116; Zack,
Dispute Settlement in the Public Sector, 14 N.Y.L.F. 249, 259 (1968). But see How-
lett, Contract Negotiation Arbitration in the Public Sector, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 47,
57-61 (1973).
51 Gould, supra note 33, at 840.
52 See part III A infra. The Minnesota experience since 1947 with compulsory arbi-
tration has been similar. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.35-179.39 (1966). Less than 26
percent of contract negotiations in hospitals went to arbitration. Howlett, supra note
50, at 60.
53 Zack, supra note 50, at 258.
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democracy. 54 Although the concept of voluntarism has persisted through-
out the history of collective bargaining, for many years arbitration has
been used in resolving grievance disputes.5 Given the changing circum-
stances in society and labor relations since the advent of collective bar-
gaining, it might now be appropriate to arbitrate collective bargaining
disputes as well.
Opposition to legislated arbitration is sometimes grounded in the as-
sertion -that arbitration will detrimentally affect the relationship between
the parties.56 It is claimed that arbitration, unlike collective bargaining,
does not 'have the ,beneficial side effect of developing mutual respect and
rapport. Arbitration, however, need not eliminate bargaining table nego-
tiations. Collective bargaining can continue until a deadlock is reached,
if it ever -is. When and if arbitration does become necessary, if an arbitra-
tor is competent and gives attention to the employer-employee relation-
ship in formulating his -award, neither arbitration nor the resulting award
should damage employer-employee relations.
Although agreeing that compulsory arbitration was efficient, one critic
summarized -the opposition to arbitration by pointing out that efficiency
was only one consideration and noting that a dictatorship was the most
efficient system. He advised that a conscientious and proper use of fact-
finding would accomplish the same result sought by those who propose
compulsory arbitration as a panacea. 5
Particular objections to interest arbitration arise in the public sector
because of the peculiar status of the employer. Legislated interest arbi-
tration may involve an unconstitutional delegation of public sovereignty,5 8
since elected officials can not delegate their duty to settle questions of
resource allocation. These decisions are political and properly reserved
for the discretion of public officials.59 This objection coincides with the
54 Interview with Arbitrator A, in Birmingham, Michigan, Jan. 2, 1974. During
the month of January, the author interviewed a number of arbitrators in the Detroit
area. These gentlemen were extremely gracious and cooperative in answering ques-
tions. They asked not to be quoted or identified, however, and for that reason will
not be referred to by name in this article.
55 See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
56 Zack, supra note 50, at 260-61.
57 See note 54 supra.
58 Bernstein, supra note 50, at 467; Garber, supra note 50, at 233-34; Gould, supra
note 33, at 840.
59 See, e.g., Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Washington
ex. rel. Everett Firefighters Local 350 v. Johnson, 46 Wash. 114, 278 P.2d 662 (1955)
(City charter provision for compulsory arbitration of firemen's wage dispute was
held an unlawful delegation of power.). Cf. Comment, supra note 24, which notes:
[M]ost of the cases in which arbitration has been held an impermis-
sible delegation are distinguishable from those which would arise in
the present setting in that in these cases there was no statute autho-
rizing even public employee bargaining itself. Since, under such cir-
cumstances bargaining itself could be construed as an imperrntissible
delegation, it followed logically that an agreement to submit disputes to
arbitration was likewise invalid.
Id. at 282.
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school board's interest in protecting its managerial prerogatives and tradi-
tional authority from encroachment not only by teachers but by outsiders,
such as arbitrators. When statutory criteria guide the arbitrator, however,
the argument of unconstitutionality should be considerably weakened. 60
Moreover,
endorsement of collective negotiations is a tacit acknowledge-
ment that the right to make unilateral decisions must be relin-
quished.... [B] y granting to public employees -the right to ne-
gotiate collectively, the legislature has already relinquished a
portion of its sovereignty. 61
When collective bargaining has failed, further legislative delegation of
power to an arbitrator is merely the next step. Grievance arbitration in the
public sector was also once considered an unlawful delegation of author-
ity. 62 Thus, while compulsory interest arbitration may indeed require
some modification of traditional beliefs with respect to representative
government, such delegation is now recognized as constitutional.63
Some critics suggest 64 that few 'arbitrators possess the sophistication
and expertise in public finance that is needed to deal with problems in
public -labor disputes, many of which involve government budgets. Arbi-
trators should have developed a familiarity with public finance, however,
through their work in mediation and factfinding in public sector dis-
putes. 65
Many commentators question66 whether an outside arbitrator will ad-
equately consider the public interest and welfare. A related concern is
that arbitration assignments might become political appointments, and,
consequently, political considerations might become the arbitrators' pri-
mary concern. The integrity of arbitrators could then be questioned, and
the process of arbitration would be "dismembered. ' 67 This potential
problem would be mitigated in jurisdictions with arbitration statutes con-
taining decision-making criteria, including the public interest. 68 Further,
6 0 Fire Fighters Local 412 v. City of Dearborn, 42 Mich. App. 51, 201 N.W.2d 650
(1972); School Dist. of Seward Educ. Ass'n v. School Dist., 188 Neb. 772, 199 N.W.2d
752 (1972); Harney v. Russo, 435 Pa. 183, 255 A.2d 560 (1969); City of Warwick v.
Regular Firemen's Ass'n, 106 RI. 109, 256 A.2d 206 (1969); State ex. rel. Fire
Fighters Local 946 v. City of Laramie, 437 P.2d 295 (Wyo. 1968).
61 Garber, supra note 50, at 233.
62 See Fellows v. LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Ringer, Legality
and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in Public Em-
ploynent, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 121, 129-37 (1968).
63 See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
64 E.g., Bernstein, supra note 50, at 468.
65 Interview with Arbitrator B, in Southfield, Michigan, Jan. 2, 1974.
66 E.g., Garber, supra note 50, at 233.
67 See note 54 supra.
68 See, e.g., MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.239(c) (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
111.77(6)(c) (Supp. 1973). According to the Michigan statute the following factors
are to be considered:
(a) The lawful authority of the employer.
(b) Stipulations of the parties.
(c) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the
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there is no evidence that arbitrators have subordinated the public good to
other concerns in previous mediation, factfinding, or grievance arbitra-
tion situations. Besides, the arbitrator does not have absolute discretion in
making the decision. If the arbitrator's decision is arbitrary or if it does
not take into account the public interest, the award may be set aside by
the courts or by a Public Employment Relations Board, according to the
particular review procedure established in the statute. 69
Another concern 70 is that the arbitrator's award will not necessarily
settle the dispute or prevent -the work stoppage since the parties will be
unsatisfied unless they work out their own solution. Intransigence is pos-
sible, yet it seems likely that public pressure will force compliance or else
the award will have to be judicially enforced. 71 In light of the availabil-
ity of binding arbitration as a viable alternative to a strike, courts should




Thirteen states71 are now experimenting with legislated interest arbi-
unit of government to meet those costs.
(d) Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the
employees involved in the arbitration proceeding with the wages, hours
and conditions of employment of other employees performing similar
services and with other employees generally:
(i) In public employment in comparable communities.
(ii) In private employment in comparable communities.
(e) The average consumer prices for goods and services, commonly
known as the cost of living.
(f) The overall compensation presently received by the employees, in-
cluding direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays and other ex-
cused time, insurance and pensions, medical and hospitalization bene-
fits, the continuity and stability of employment, and all other benefits
received.
(g) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency
of the arbitration proceedings.
(h) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are nor-
mally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of
wages, hours and conditions of employment through voluntary collective
bargaining, mediation, fact finding, arbitration or otherwise between
the parties in the public sector or in private employment.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.239 (Supp. 1973).
69 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.242 (Supp. 1973). Arbitration orders will
be reviewed
only for reasons that the arbitration panel was without or exceeded its
jurisdiction; the order is unsupported by competent, material and sub-
stantial evidence on the whole record; or the order was procured by
fraud, collusion or other similar and unlawful means.
Because review of awards is so limited, the review procedure will be effective as a
check only in instances of great abuse.
70 Anderson, Compulsory Arbitration Under State Statutes, in PROCEEDINGS OF
N.Y.U. 22ND ANNUAL CONF. ON LABOR 259, (1970); Zack, supra note 50, at 259.
71 Howlett, supra note 50, at 62.
72 Id.
73 These states are Alaska, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 965 (Supp.
1973); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.231 (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.72
(Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-810 (1972); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.200 (1973);
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tration in the public sector. The state statutes are somewhat different. In
no case has interest arbitration been applied to teacher contract negoti-
ations.
III. LAST FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION BY ISSUE
A. Michigan Policemen's and Firemen's
Arbitration Act: An Example
Since 1969, Michigan has had a compulsory arbitration statute74 cov-
ering all of the state's police and firefighters. Under the statute, hereafter
referred to as the Police-Firefighters Act, arbitration can be initiated by
either the employees or the employer and usually begins after an impasse
which more conciliatory measures were unable to resolve. 75 The orders
of arbitration panels are reviewable only if the panel was without or ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction, the order is unsupported by competent, material,
and substantial evidence on the whole record, or the order was procured
by fraud, collusion, or other similar and unlawful means. 76
Statistics from 1969 through August, 1973, indicate the success of the
legislation. There were no firefighter strikes and only ten police strikes
during that period. Three of the police strikes involved noncollective bar-
gaining issues. 77 In each instance of a strike, neither the police officers
nor the city involved understood the procedures to be followed under the
new statute.78 By comparison, from 1965 to 1969 there was a total of
twenty-four city employee strikes.79
OKLA. STAT. tit. 11, § 548.1 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 1101.101 (1973); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.1-2, 28-9.2-2 (1969); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 9-14A-1
(1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1721 (1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11 1.70(4)(jm) (Supp.
1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-265 (1967).
74 Policemen's and Firemen's Arbitration Act, MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§
423.231-423.246 (Supp. 1973).
75 A hearing is conducted by the arbitration panel which consists of an employer's
delegate, an employee's delegate, and an impartial arbitrator, who serves as chairman.
The arbitrator-chairman is chosen by the employer and employee delegates unless
they cannot agree, in which case the mediation board appoints the arbitrator. During
the course of the hearing, the chairman can remand the dispute to the parties for
further collective bargaining for a period not to exceed three weeks. A majority
decision of the arbitration panel is final and binding upon the parties and may be
enforced by either party or by the arbitration panel in the circuit court for the county
in which the dispute arose or in which a majority of the affected employees reside.
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.234-423.242 (Supp. 1973).
76 MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.242 (Supp. 1973).
77 These statistics were obtained in a telephone interview with Robert Howlett,
Chairman, Michigan Employment Relations Commission, in Grand Rapids, Michigan,
Oct. 23, 1973.
78 Howlett Address, supra note 2.
79 [1968-1969] MICH. DEP'T OF LABOR ANN. REP., Table 12, at 75. The Department
of Labor's classification "city employees" include police, firemen, Department of
Public Works, and municipal employees. Statistics on teacher strikes from 1965-1966
to 1968-1969 show that there was a total of seventy-nine strikes: nine in 1965-1966;
four in 1966-1967; forty-three in 1967-1968; and twenty-three in 1968-1969. During
1969-1970 alone there were fifty-two strikes by school professionals. [1969-1970]
MICH. DEP'T OF LABOR ANN. REP., Table 18, at 86. For the period of 1970-1973
[VOL. 7:575
Teacher Strikes
Between 1969 and 1973, 233 cases were submitted under the Police-
Firefighters Act.80 Ninety-seven awards were issued, thirty-five of which
were unanimous decisions. Sixty-two cases are still officially pending, but
the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) believes that
several of these cases have been settled. Equally significant, well over
three hundred cases were settled without going to arbitration. Thus, expe-
rience under the Police-Firefighters Act decisively refutes the contention
that the presence of compulsory arbitration results in deterioration of col-
lective bargaining. 81 Firemen and policemen remain enthusiastic about
the law.82 The Michigan statute was amended in 1972, effective January
1, 1973, to provide for last final offer arbitration as to all economic is-
sues.
8 3
B. Characteristics of Last Final Ofler Arbitration
Last final offer arbitration by issue is a refinement of the "either-or"
arbitration procedure, sometimes referred to as the "selector method. 's4
Under the selector method, when negotiations reach impasse, each party
submits its last final offer and a neutral third party selects in toto the offer
which seems more reasonable. The underlying theory is that
[the] [elmployer and union, [each] realizing that the arbitra-
tor's power is limited to accepting the entire proposed contract
of one or the other party will bargain in good faith and in great
earnestness to reach an agreement. If this process fails to pro-
duce agreement, it will, nevertheless, narrow very substantially
the area of disagreement as each party strains for a favorable
decision from the arbitrators by attempting to make its position
the more reasonable of the two.8 5
there were fifty strikes by school professionals: twenty-five in 1970-1971; nine in
1971-1972; and sixteen in 1972-1973. [1972-1973] MICH. DEP'T OF LABOR ANN. REP.,
Table 8, at 166. In 1973 there were forty strikes. Howlett Address, supra note 2.
80 See note 77 supra.
81 For instance, statistics from the Mediation Division show that during 1972-
1973, the basis for closing the forty-nine cases under the Police-Firefighters Arbitra-
tion Act was legislatively required arbitration. There were 202 cases reported for
police and firemen in 1972-1973. "Thus, a minimum of 75% of police-firefighter
cases were resolved by agreement of the parties without going to arbitration." [1972-
1973] MICH. DEP'T OF LABOR ANN. REP. at 139, Table 6, at 165.
82 Howlett Address, supra note 2.
83 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.238 (Supp. 1973). Each party is to submit its
last final offer on the issues identified by the arbitration panel as economic. The panel
is then to adopt the last offer of settlement that more nearly complies with the criteria
listed in the Act. See note 106 infra. Noneconomic issues are to be decided by the
traditional methods of arbitration. The panel is required to make written findings of
fact and to promulgate a written opinion or order upon the issues presented. Except
for the addition of these provisions, the compulsory arbitration statute of 1969 re-
mains intact.
84 See generally Stevens, supra note 42; Stevens, supra note 48.
85 H. WELLINGTON & R. WINTER, THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES, 180 (1971), as
quoted in Howlett, supra note 50, at 72.
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Nonetheless, the effectiveness of "either-or" arbitration is hampered by
its lack of flexibility, for the arbitrator must select one or the other of the
proposals in its entirety even though the package chosen might contain a
particularly unreasonable element.8 6 Last final offer arbitration by issue
furnishes the missing flexibility by allowing the arbitrator to choose be-
tween the final offers of the parties on an issue by issue basis. The arbi-
trator does not, however, have the power to compromise any differences
between the two proposals or to determine an award in any way indepen-
dent of the parties' own offers.
The basic premise of last final offer arbitration is that it would seldom
have to be used. Since the arbitrator could not compromise the difference
between the parties in order to arrive at a reasonable solution, each party
would be forced to develop a realistic position, at least on important is-
sues, or risk the possibility that the arbitrator might choose the other
party's offer. In the process of trying to present the more reasonable of-
fer, the parties' negotiating positions would move closer and
closer together. With the area of disagreement already substantially nar-
rowed, it is hoped that they would decide that voluntary agreement would
be preferable to the uncertainty involved in submitting the issues to arbi-
tration. Thus, the primary goal of assuring that the parties reach agree-
ment through negotiations would be enhanced. 7 The uncertainties of
last final offer by issue and the fact that the arbitrator has ultimate au-
thority can motivate the parties to reach agreement. Thus, because the
outcome of last final offer arbitration is outside the parties' control, it pro-
vides a real incentive to bargain.88
C. Criticisms of Last Final Offer Arbitration
In spite of the theoretical merits of the last final offer procedure, con-
siderable opposition to it exists.8 1' The objections 0 to more traditional
forms of compulsory arbitration are also raised against last final offer arbi-
tration, but the argument that compulsory arbitration will undermine col-
lective bargaining and lead to extreme positions"1 is weakened by last
80 Bernstein, supra note 50, at 468-69.
87 The emphasis on the parties reaching agreement through negotiation reflects the
democratic values of self-determination and voluntarism which have been advanced
in employer-employee relations. Support for a voluntary rather than an arbitrated
agreement also stems from a feeling that the parties will not be truly satisfied unless
they work out a solution for themselves. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text
supra.
88 Interview with Arbitrator D, in Detroit, Michigan, discussing a recent experience
under the Act, Jan. 4, 1974. This arbitrator felt that his clarification, at the prehearing
conference, of what last final offer entailed had been a sobering experience for the
parties. After he had explained the process to be followed, the parties settled without
arbitration.
89 See generally Long, National Emergency Disputes in the Transportation Indus-
try: An Analysis of Final Ofler Selection as a Solution to the Problem, 42 U. CIN. L.
REV. 101, 116-22 (1973).
90 See notes 49-72 and accompanying text supra.
91 See note 50 supra.
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final offer's tendency to drive the parties together. In fact, the 1972
amendments to the Michigan Police-Firefighters Arbitration Act, which
provided for last final offer arbitration by issue, "were specifically de-
signed to strengthen the collective bargaining process in the resolution of
impasses. 9
2
Although the arbitrator does, in a sense, impose a settlement on the
parties when he combines -portions of each side's proposals to make up a
whole contract, it is less of an imposition than under traditional arbitration
because the arbitrator's award is composed solely of the last offers of the
parties. Accordingly, last final offer arbitration involves less delegation of
authority and less of an infringement on the concept of voluntarism in
employer-employee relations than is commonly attributed to conventional
arbitration. 93 Since the arbitrator selects between the parties' alternatives,
the parties will be forced to take part in negotiations. If the collective bar-
gaining process actually furthers the employer-employee relationship,9 4
the last final offer method will promote the relationship between the par-
ties, encouraging them to reconcile their conflicting interests.
There are, however, some criticisms specific to this type of arbitration.
The first is that this procedure will not drive the parties closer together,
but will result, at best, in gamesmanship or, at worst, in collusive agree-
ment.93 A related criticism is the possibility that practice with last final
offer will only sharpen the parties' skill in determining what the arbitrator
will deem acceptable and, therefore, they may not negotiate or yield
beyond that point.9 6 The consequences of losing the gamble minimize the
likelihood of parties engaging in brinkmanship or submitting outrageous
proposals. In addition, an arbitrator can be given the power to send both
parties back to the bargaining table and to ask for revised final offers if
he suspects that they are not being entirely forthright. 97 Last final offer
could, however, introduce a greater sense of responsibility into the bar-
gaining process because the arbitrator, under the law, must take one of
the offers. 98
Critics also claim that the arbitrator's selection between the final offers
92 [1972-1973] MICH. DEP'T OF LABOR ANN. REP., at 159.
93 See notes 53, 58 supra.
94 See note 56 supra.
95 Since in this situation the risks run by a party engaging in gamesmanship are so
great, a party wishing to gamble by offering only objectionable terms of settlement
would have to convince the other party to do likewise.
[T]hey would need to make, in effect, a collusive agreement ....
And since no dispute-settling procedure which yielded such (objection-
able and arbitrary) results would be acceptable, the gamble would have
to be construed as a collusive attack on the procedure itself, rather
than as an attempt to get a favorable result from the use of that pro-
cedure.
Stevens, supra note 42, at 197-98. Moreover, since the parties were not able to agree
on the terms of a contract, it is unlikely that they will be able to reach the level of
accord necessary to design and execute a collusive agreement.
96 See note 54 supra.
97 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 423.237a (Supp. 1973).
M Interview with Arbitrator E, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Jan. 23, 1974.
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for each issue is impractical on two counts.99 First, they are concerned
about the difficulty that the parties will have in stipulating which issues
are economic and which are noneconomic and in separating out the issues
in each category. Indeed, almost every issue can in some sense be re-
duced to economic considerations. One arbitrator who is experienced in
last final offer arbitration stated that :the economic and noneconomic is-
sues were not hard to separate. 00 Only experience with last final offer
will show whether ,there are so many "hybrid" issues that segregating
economic from noneconomic issues will be impossible.
Secondly, in the event that a selection must be made, critics wonder
how arbitrators will be able to decide which offer is more reasonable.
Probably arbitrators will continue to look to the same factors that have
guided them in traditional arbitration proceedings.' 01 This problem will
also be alleviated if the statute sets forth criteria for determining reason-
ableness, as the Michigan statute does. 1'0 2 Under the Michigan scheme, a
catchall provision provides that arbitrators are not confined to the enumer-
ated factors, but may refer to any other standards normally taken into
consideration. 0 3
A serious problem does exist with regard to the last final offer selection
mechanism. Arbitrators do not like being constrained by the parties' last
final offers; they would rather have the complete discretion that they had
in the traditional form of compulsory arbitration. 0 4 One arbitrator
stated -that he was generally uncomfortable with his role in selection un-
der last final offer because he could no longer study both sides and decide
what he thought was a fair or reasonable offer in terms of the equities
and exigencies of the situation, but could only decide which offer was
more reasonable in comparison to the others. 0 5
The fairness of a last final offer award is also questioned. There is
some sentiment'0" that the offer selected may be overly advantageous to
the winning party and too harsh on the loser. If last final offer operates
according to its theory, a selection between offers will never have to be
made. When, however, the arbitrator must make a selection, the mechan-
ism guards against such an untenable outcome.' 0 7 If mediation or fact-
finding must be invoked as a matter of course before the last final offers
are submitted, the danger of an unfair award will be even further re-
duced. The disgruntled party also could have taken precautions against
99 Long, supra note 89, at 117-19.
100 See note 88 supra.
101 See notes 65, 88 supra.
102 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 423.239 (Supp. 1973). See also note 68 supra.
103 MICH. COMp. LAws ANN. § 423.239(h) (Supp. 1973).
104 See notes 65, 88, 101 supra.
105 See note 65 supra.
1O6 Long, supra note 89, at 120-22.
107 The arbitrator under last final offer may select only the reasonable elements of
each party's offer in putting together his award. Under some systems he may even
reject both sides' final offers and send the parties back to the bargaining table.
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being subjected to harsh contract provisions by continuing to negotiate or
by presenting the more reasonable offer.10
Perhaps the most serious criticism of the last final offer process is that
there are certain types of issues, such as working rules, technological
change, and other policy considerations, that simply do not lend them-
selves to this procedure and need the flexibility that traditional arbitration
provides. Under this view, traditional arbitration is superior because the
arbitrator has power to review these noneconomic considerations and to
arrive at a fair accommodation of the interests involved. As one arbitrator
stated, some issues of principle are compromisable but not divisible. 1 '0
D. Experience with Last Final Offer Arbitration
Last final offer arbitration is the most recent innovation in impasse
resolution mechanisms. A few states besides Michigan have noted the
promise of last final offer and have implemented it. Wisconsin is now
experimenting with last final offer arbitration. 110 Massachusetts legislated
last final offer for police and firemen at the end of 1973.111 Since 1947,
Minnesota has had an arbitration law that contains a modified version of
last final offer. 11 2
The Michigan experience with last final offer arbitration has been lim-
ited to date. Because the fiscal year-end for most cities is June 30, no
cases were submitted under last final offer until June, 1973, in spite of
the fact that the authorizing amendment took effect on January 1,
1973.113 As of October 26, 1973, forty-nine cases have been submitted.
108 Long, supra note 89, at 122.
109 Interview with Arbitrator F, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, Jan. 24, 1974.
110 In Wisconsin, last final offer arbitration (by package) is limited to municipal
law enforcement and firefighter personnel. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (1972). The
procedure became effective April 21, 1972. Between April 21 and June 30, 1972, nine
such cases were initiated. Eight cases remained pending as of June 30, 1972. One
case was closed prior to the appointment of the arbitrator. During the fiscal year
July 1, 1972, through June 30, 1973, forty-one cases were received, thirty cases were
closed, and nineteen cases remained pending. Awards were issued in only ten cases.
The offer of the employer was selected in five cases, while the offer of the labor
organization was selected in the other five. The remaining closed cases were closed
either through mediation during the investigation of the petition for arbitration or
were resolved prior to the investigation. However, in three cases the issues were
resolved after the appointment of the arbitrator but prior to the arbitration hearing.
In one case, the Commission dismissed the petition since the conditions precedent to
arbitration had not been met. Letter from Morris Slavney, Chairman, Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Commission to Diane Kaye, Jan. 8, 1974, on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform.
111 BNA GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. No. 533, at B-6 (Dec. 10, 1973).
112 Under the Minnesota law, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.92 (Supp. 1974), public em-
ployees and labor organizations are required to submit their final position on each
issue to the Public Employment Relations Board, but the arbitration panel is not
required to select either of the last positions. However, with respect to "essential em-
ployees," the parties may agree that the panel shall select one of the parties' last
offer. Since the statute went into effect Minnesota has never had a strike in its hos-
pitals. Moreover, of the approximately 1,315 contract negotiations in hospitals, only
251 (less than 26 percent) went to arbitration.
113 Howlett Address, supra note 2.
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One decision has been handed down, but it involved only noneconomic
issues. Thirteen cases were settled prior to submission to an arbitrator,
while three cases were settled after an arbitrator had been appointed.
Twenty-five cases are still open in the hands of the arbitrator. Seven cases
are open, but have probably been settled without appointment of an arbi-
trator and without notice to MERC of settlement. That so many of the
cases were settled short of actual arbitration is an encouraging sign.
114
IV. CONCLUSION
The ultimate question is whether last final offer arbitration can be ef-
fective in teacher-school board negotiations. If teachers and school boards
cannot resolve their differences through the preferred method of collective
bargaining, last final offer may well be the best alternative. In the words
of one arbitrator, last final offer gives the parties more say in their own
destiny. 115 Moreover, -in the hands of a competent arbitrator, last final
offer arbitration is not a rigid mechanism, but can be adapted to deal with
the idiosyncrasies of each case. For instance, the arbitrator has the flex-
ibility to invoke mediation or to encourage further negotiations while the
parties are formulating their offers. Thus, he can incorporate some of the
benefits of the progressive impasse resolution procedure1 6 or the blue
ribbon commission,117 and yet retain a certainty of resolution within a
specified period of time.
Last final offer also seems well suited to some of the particular charac-
teristics of teacher contract negotiations." 8 These characteristics include
the teachers' individuality, -their inexperience in collective bargaining,
114 Statistics compiled under the Police-Firefighters Arbitration Act between Oc-
tober 1, 1969, and September 30, 1972, disclosed the following:
Cases submitted to arbitrator 161
Awards 78
Settled prior to award 43
Pending 35
Unanimous decisions 27
Howlett, supra note 50, at 58.
115 See note 101 supra.
116 Under a progressive impasse resolution system, the parties would be permitted
a limited right to strike provided that they had first utilized mediation and factfinding
in good faith and had still been unable to reach agreement. The strike would be de-
clared unlawful and compulsory arbitration required only upon a determination that
the public welfare was imperiled by the strike.
117 A blue ribbon commission could be composed of labor, management, and pub-
lic members appointed on a non-partisan basis by the governor with the advice and
consent of a person in a key position in labor relations. Should the commission con-
clude that a strike endangers the public well-being, it could exercise any of its alter-
native powers. The choice of procedures would include mediation, factfinding, com-
pulsory arbitration, and the ability to obtain an injunction or a mandamus order to
bargain in good faith. The theory is that fear of having the power of the commission
invoked would drive the parties to the bargaining table.
118 See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
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their militancy and adamance, 1 9 and the many policy considerations,
such as class size, which retard the progress of negotiations each year.
Teachers in Detroit in 1973 were not enthusiastic about the prospect of
compulsory arbitration. By comparison, the enhanced control over the
terms of the settlement should make last final offer arbitration more ac-
ceptable to teachers.
Whether the last final offer statute governing policemen and firemen
could be extended to cover teachers, or whether a new act should be
designed specifically for teachers can also be debated. While the teachers'
negotiations are not identical to those of policemen and firemen, sufficient
parallels exist so that insight can be gained from the experience with
police and firefighters. The statutory criteria that constrain the arbitrator's
discretion would probably be basically the same, particularly if noneco-
nomic issues continue to be decided by traditional arbitration and not by
last final offer. 120 One desirable change might be a requirement that
settlement be reached by the date on which schools are scheduled to
open.
Upon reflection it seems that the situation last fall may have foreshad-
owed an annual fall event. The desirability of having resolution of con-
tract disputes between teachers and school boards without a protracted
strike was demonstrated, as was the need for a new impasse resolution
mechanism. The experience with policemen and firemen in Michigan has
shown that legislated arbitration is an effective approach, and the last
final offer variation thus far appears to be a potential improvement of
such arbitration. Last final offer arbitration seems to have a chance for
success in resolving teacher contract disputes. Given what is at stake, it
is at least worth the experiment.
-Diane L. Kaye
119 See note 79 supra. The annual report of the Michigan Department of Labor
points out that while in 1972-73 most categories did not show significant changes and
other public employees' strike activity decreased during that period, there was an
increase in the number of strikes by public school professionals and public school
nonprofessionals. [1972-1973] MICH. DEP'T OF LABOR ANN. REP. 141. See generally
Hazard, Collective Bargaining in Education: The Anatomy of a Problem, 18
LAB. L.J. 412 (1967); Leddy, Negotiating with School Teachers: Anatomy of a Muddle,
33 OHIo ST. L.J. 811 (1972).
120 See text accompanying note 109 supra.
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